In this paper, we evaluate the possible impact of the labor and wage policy in Bolivia's economy in the event of a reduction in the price of exports. For this analysis, we use a CGE model with a 2012 SAM. The Bolivian labor policy is characterized by compulsory increments in the private formal wage and an expanding labor force in the public services. A labor supply function allows migration between formality and informality and a reservation wage curve differentiates the nature of unemployment in the formal and the informal sector. The labor and wage policy does three things: 1) it promotes household consumption but reduces the GDP, decreases investment and growth, 2) it increases the rate of formality only at the expense of higher unemployment, and 3) it swells the primary sector to the detriment of the secondary sector. In the face of a decrease in commodity prices, Bolivia needs to make a correction of course in the labor and wage policy.
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I. Introduction
Throughout its history and up until the present day, Bolivia's main exports have been minerals and natural gas. The last boom in export prices as well as responsible fiscal management and sustained wage increases are accountable for the reduction in poverty (PNUD, 2016) . From 2014 onwards, the external price boom started to reverse. However, labor policy has an inertia of its own. The goal of this paper is to capture the impact of the Bolivian wage and labor policy inside a context of external downturn using the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) methodology. To feed the CGE model we elaborate a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the year 2012. We run two simulation scenarios. First we introduce modifications in the wage and labor policy. Last, we incorporate a negative variation in the prices of natural gas and minerals.
The labor market in Bolivia is portrayed by high informality and a large presence of the public sector in the formal market. Labor policy is characterized by decreed rising wages generally above inflation (see Figure 1 and 2) and a continuous increase in the labor force of public services. The share of workers in the public services is persistent (see Figure 3 ) even in the face of a tumbling unemployment rate and the natural growth of the labor force.
Bolivia's exports are highly concentrated in a few capital intensive raw materials, mainly natural gas. This structure begets a fiscal income dependent on extractive industries due to the government control and ownership of the gas fields. In fact, 15% of fiscal income originates in gas fields. In addition, part of that income is earmarked for infrastructure investment. When the export prices are high, the government can employ more civil servants, however, if export prices decrease, it is not easy to dismiss workers. A feature of the labor market in Bolivia is its high level of informality. For the purposes of this research, we define informality as domestic employees, non-remunerated workers, self-account workers without tax registration, and workers without long term social security or contracts.
According to this definition, informality is around 80%.
The disturbing side of informality is its association with poverty (Smolka & Larangeira 2008) . In the year 2012, only 4% of formal workers were poor, whereas 35%of informal workers lived in poverty. This is a result of an income distribution where formal income and years of schooling are higher in every percentile (see Figure 4 and Figure 5 ) than their informal counterparts. These characteristics are more relevant for vulnerable groups: single head households, the young, indigenes, and women. Half of households headed by informal female workers live in poverty; meanwhile, just one in four households headed by formal female worker are poor. Further, activities with high levels of female hiring (sugar, miscellaneous food products, trade, restaurants and hotels, and domestic services) are also dominated by informal labor.
The evaluation of external shocks through CGE models has a short history in the analysis of the Bolivian economy (Jemio, 2003; Cicowiez, 2010; Sánchez 2009 ). In all past research, the government consumption and the labor in the public services have been exogenous. We depart from this characterization of the public sector and construct a CGE model where wages in the public services are also exogenous. This portrayal takes into account the different reasons behind an expansion of the government payroll (fairness, justice, rent seeking, clientelism) and the non-wage advantages of a public sector job, mainly stability.
Unlike Jemio (2003) and Sánchez (2009) , migration between formality and informality is represented here via a supply function supplemented with a reservation wage curve. The segmentation of the labor market is not complete because the labor supply function allows for informal workers to migrate to formality and vice versa. We assume that hikes in the compulsory wage have a positive effect on the reservation wage. For our purposes, we model the Bolivian labor market using the framework provided by the PEP-1-1 model.
Specifically, we start from an extended version developed by Cicowiez (see Section 4 and
Appendix A) and then modified it to portray the workings of the Bolivian labor market.
In a context of low export prices, we conclude that the current policy lowers the level of product, reduces investment, thus hindering growth, and yet expands household consumption. Public services is intensive in skilled labor, a factor in short supply in Bolivia.
Therefore, an expansion of the payroll in public services puts pressure on secondary sector activities and ultimately promotes the primarization of the economy.
II. Literature review
Characteristics, causes and size of informal labor and the informal economy are a constant subject in labor studies in Bolivia. A summary of the first two areas is in McKenzie (2009) and a comprehensive classification of causes is in Maloney (2007) who divides the primary causes into exit, or voluntary informality, and exclusion, or involuntary informality.
This last dichotomy is the main question about informality (Maloney, 2007; Morales, 2016) .
Poverty and low productivity are common to all studies on informality.
At first the debate about informality centered on the false identification of informality with illegal activities (Casanovas, 1992) , especially with cocoa production (Laserna, 1992; Blanes & Jimenez, 1989) Since the 90's, the approach to informality started to focus on activities that do not comply with all legal rules, but that are not criminal. Meyer (1996) links the gender income gap with different degrees of informality. From a financial perspective, Sethuraman (1998) shows that the informality of debtors does not necessarily represent their creditworthiness. Bolivia was pioneer to apply new lending technologies to serve informal debtors.
Later on, research on informality focuses on the proper estimation of its size. A straightforward method makes use of household survey data to identify informal workers' income and to estimate its share in the total economy (Landa, 2007) . From a different perspective, Vargas (2011) estimates the size of the informal economy to be around 60% in the year 2010. He applies a first differences multiple indicators multiple causes model.
Given the importance of the informal economy in Bolivia and its association with gender and poverty, any CGE aimed to model the Bolivian labor market should include informality. Lay (2006) takes into account informality and elaborates an impact evaluation of the investment in hydrocarbons in the period from 1997 to 2003, the onset of gas exports to Brazil in 1999, and the redistributive fiscal programs dedicated to poverty reduction. His findings support the hypothesis of informalization -an increase in informality -of the economy simultaneous to a drop in poverty rate.
The CGE model in Lay (2006) assumes that some activities are entirely informal and some activities are fully formal, without considering the possibility of informal labor hired directly by formal activities. Moreover, his model does not include unemployment (above 8% in the period he studied), and it has no downward restriction in real wages, which is now a feature of the labor market in Bolivia.
Another economic feature of Bolivia is its high dependence upon mining and gas exports. This trait leads to the development of CGE models aimed at capturing the impact of external shocks on poverty and to provide suggestions about policy actions to alleviate their negative consequences. MACEPES (Modelo de análisis de choques externos y de protección económica y social) is an example of this kind of study. It contains a classification of labor according to formality (Sanchez, 2011) . Unlike the CGE model from Lay (2006) the authors did not distinguish formal and informal labor or activities. They applied a more complete characterization of the Bolivian export demand allowing for a drop in volume without requiring a drop in the export price. They also endogenized unemployment using a wage curve with a negative relation between wages and unemployment (Blanchflower & Oswald, 1994) . This relation between unemployment deserves to be further explained.
Blanchflower (1994) concisely described the leading ideas about unemployment and wage: the Phillips curve, the Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium, the wage curve with negative slope, and unemployment caused by unequal labor demand and supply. The
Phillips curve draws a negative relation between the variation of wages and the unemployment rate. Harris-Todaro portrays equilibrium as a positive relation between the level of wages and unemployment. In contrast to Harris-Todaro, Blanchflower (1994) empirically drew a wage curve where unemployment and wages have a negative relation.
This positive relationship is present in dozens of countries.
Hernández (2012) used a Harris-Todaro wage gap function to model unemployment and formal-informal migration for the Colombian economy. He introduced a wage curve in the formal market and competitive equilibrium in the informal market. In this manner, unemployment occurs in the formal sector and higher wages imply higher unemployment.
Another way to model unemployment and labor migration is in Savard (2003 This dynamic versatility comes at the expense of some simplification. Similar to Lay's (2006 ) model, Jemio (2001 distinguishes between formal and informal activities. However, wage earners are only linked to formal activities and there are two kinds of profits. The first type accrues to formal capital owners in corporate firms; the second type belongs to households and represents income for informal workers. Moreover, there is no treatment of unemployment. In consequence, an increase of a formal activity in its participation in production is mirrored by labor migration and a higher rate of labor formality.
An adequate representation of the Bolivian labor market should take into account unemployment, informality and formal-informal migration. However, one aspect lacking in all of the models above is the role of the public services sector in the labor market, specifically in the formal sector due to its large presence on formal and skilled workers employment (between a third and a half). Gregory (1999) presupposed a qualitative difference between the motives and means in the private sector and the public sector.
However, the standard CGE model does not add in differences in the form of the production function, or the labor demand function among the economic activities in the model, whether private or public.
The imposition of restrictions in the economy by the government generates rent seeking opportunities (Krueger, 1974) . Labor demand in the public sector is an example of that. The government could either allow competition for rents with social groups struggling to be part of the payroll, or restrict competition favoring a specific social group. Rent seeking behavior in the allocation of public employment puts pressure on increasing public labor demand and reduces the overall efficiency. In general, government surplus labor could be explained by a combination of cognitive myopia in the public and private sphere, leverage of non-state actors favoring anti-growth policies and institutional weakness (Ross, 1999 ).
The public sector has different reasons and follows different constraints in hiring than the private sector. Behind the distribution of wages in the public sector there are goals of equity and fairness. Also, the public sector needs to portray itself as a model employer and avoid paying low wages or wages higher than the private sector. (Blaise Melly, 2005) .
Taking a step aside of the usual CGE modelling of the public sector as a neoclassical activity with salaries equal to the value of the marginal product of labor, Gelb (1991) addressed government employment portraying a Harris-Todaro equilibrium in the urban (modern) and rural labor markets. In this model, government employment is divided into unproductive and productive labor. In this paper, we assume that an increase in public sector labor has a null influence in the level of production of public services. Behind this machinery there is an unfavorable view of public current expenditure 1 .
In short, there are two differing approaches in the modelling the public sector. One could either treat it like any other sector under the ruling of the first order conditions inside a competitive market, or one could only state political or social goals. CGE literature on Bolivia tends to follow the first approach.
1 Nevertheless, Devarajan (1996) presented empirical evidence sustaining the opposite: a bigger current expenditure share is associated with a higher growth rate; meanwhile, an increase in capital expenditure generates a lower per capita GDP. Thus, as is common in economics, there are no definitive answers.
Informality incorporation into a CGE framework and the evaluation of external shocks on the Bolivian economy is not novel. However, since 2006, the labor policy landscape has gained new elements (mandatory wage increments), and consequently there is a need to reexamine the comprehensive treatment of unemployment and formal-informal migration.
Also, it is important to specifically take into account the public administration because its payroll covers between a third to a half of total formal workers.
III. Data

SAM construction
For the purpose of this paper, we construct a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) using 
Factor intensity
Agricultural activities are highly dependent on informal unskilled male labor (see Table 2 ). On the opposite side of the spectrum, crude oil & natural gas is intensive on capital and does not hire informal labor. Electricity and financial services follow a similar pattern and are concentrated on the formal labor market. From the HS we find a slight level of informality in the public sector, around 3%. This number could be explained by consultants unaffiliated to long term social insurance or with contracts in the making. Due to its insignificant level, for the SAM calibration we combine the informal public labor categories with their formal counterparts. Besides agriculture, informality is also concentrated in construction and transportation. Activities with high levels of female hiring (sugar, miscellaneous food products, trade, restaurants and hotels, and domestic services)
are also dominated by informal labor.
Value added and export, import intensity
Natural gas and minerals generate 20% of the added value and they are two of the most export oriented activities (see Table 3 ). In fact, exports from other sectors are inconsequential as a result of their low participation in the gross output. Therefore, Bolivia is a developing economy highly concentrated in the primary sector. As a consequence, the supply of manufacture products and between a tenth and a quarter of the food products come from abroad. For example, other manufactured goods account for less than 1% of the total domestic supply. However, imports of other manufacturers are more than 13 times the value of the domestic supply.
Factor income and household participation
Households' main sources of income present a typical structure (see Table 4 ). The leading source of income for non-poor urban households comes from capital ownership and formal skilled male labor. Meanwhile, the rest of household categories earn most of their income from informal unskilled labor. Female labor represents the second source of income only for poor rural households. Around 75% of the government payroll is allocated to nonpoor urban households because public services are intensive in skilled labor (see Table 5 ).
This implies that a simulation of an increase in labor demand for public services impacts skilled labor.
Labor by activity and unemployment
The equations in the model section are in terms of volume of labor. For this reason, the SAM has an auxiliary matrix with the number of people allocated to each activity. Table   6 portrays labor in percentages. Industrial agriculture, livestock and trade are the activities with the greatest number of workers and comprise of 41% of the total labor (almost 5 million workers in the year 2012). Public services is the fourth largest category with 7.9% of the total employment. The intensity of each activity by labor type is similar to the factor intensity by total payment.
The unemployment rate for female labor (4.5%) is higher than the unemployment rate among male labor (2.2%). Also, as expected, skilled labor has a higher rate (4.7%) than unskilled labor (2.4%). This pattern repeats itself when labor is classified into four categories by gender and level of skill (see Table 7 ). The division between formal and informal unemployment follows the proportions suggested in Fernandez (2016) , assigning approximately two thirds of the rate of unemployment to high productivity (formal) workers. 
Demand elasticities and other parameters
IV. The model
Here we present a stylized labor market model for the Bolivian economy in the context of a CGE model. We start from an extended version of the PEP-1-1 standard model 3 to portray the workings of public services, the relationship between unemployment and wages for the formal and informal sector, and the migration of labor from formality to informality and vice versa. The PEP-1-1 extended version follows the same structure except on two issues. First, wages are not normalized as we explain below. The model takes into account the actual number of workers. Second, wages are not equal throughout all labor types and activities, but differ by type of activity and labor 4 .
In the PEP-1-1 standard model, # $ wages are normalized, therefore the wage rate paid by industry j for type l labor, including payroll taxes % $,' , is equal to
Where # $ is the normalized wage and % $,' is the tax rate. In contrast, the extended version does not use an arbitrary labor unit to achieve normalization. The wage # $ is the average wage for l and equal to:
The activity-specific wage #-$ is the payment received by each type of labor in each activity. The wage distortion #; $ is a parameter defined as #-$ the divided by the average wage # $ .
Using #; $ , the extended model defines the wage rate paid by industry j for type l labor #% $,' as:
In this manner, the extended model introduces a wedge among wages in different activities for a specific type of labor. This functional form is appropriate for our purposes because it reflects the structural factors that underlay the wage distribution across activities.
Specifically, average formal wages are greater than the informal ones.
Starting from the PEP-1-1 extended model, we introduce new equations regarding the labor market and the public sector services. The CGE model assembled here has the following features:
• Downward restriction to real wages.
• Wage curve.
• Labor supply derived from a CET (constant elasticity of transformation) that preserves additivity.
• Exogenous public services wage.
• Exogenous public services labor demand, met before any other demand.
• Constant public services production.
Wage curve and downward restriction
The real wage #7 $ is the wage the # $ wage divided by the consumer price index =>.
The real wage is always equal or greater than the reservation wage #77 $ . The wage curve (Blanchflower & Oswald, 1994) here is a reservation wage curve because it portrays the relation between #77 $ and unemployment 5 $ . The real wage in the base period #7, $ is a parameter in the specification of the wage curve. The base period unemployment 5, $ is also a parameter. The unemployment elasticity of the real wage is negative ? $ < 0 . This elasticity shows the responsiveness of the real wage to changes in 5 $ .
The estimation of the wage curve is an ongoing effort in developing countries where there are mayor differences between formal and informal workers. Baltagi (2013) and Ramos (2012) agree in a higher ? $ for informal workers in developing countries. We assume ? E = −0.2 for informal workers. In contrast, we assume ? I = 0 in the formal market. Therefore, changes in the real wage of formal workers and unemployment are independent (i.e. the neoclassical case).
The real wage for any type of labor cannot be lower than its reservation wage. Since ? I = 0 means that for all formal categories of labor the wage curve is horizontal, the formal real wage is always above the base level. In other words, there is a downward restriction to formal real wages:
In regards of the informal labor a higher unemployment 5 $ reduces the reservation wage and, thus, the real wage is lower than the base period level. This feature represents an economy with indexed formal salaries.
The equality between labor supply and demand implies zero unemployment. If we move equilibrium wage upwards, unemployment will rise. This movement draws an implicit function between the level of unemployment and wages with a positive slope. Meanwhile, the wage curve draws the same relationship with negative slope in the informal labor market and a horizontal line in the formal labor market. For analytic purposes, this implicit function and the wage curve should be considered jointly and their intersection establishes the final equilibrium point 5 .
We assume that wage and labor policy (compulsory rises in formal wages and in the minimum wage) impact the workers' reservation wage shifting the wage curve upwards. In the formal markets, the rise in the reservation wages causes a higher level of wages and of unemployment. In the informal markets, this movement causes both a rise in wages and unemployment that is relatively lower than in the formal cases.
Labor supply
The SAM contains 12 types of labor and there are also 12 types of labor demands.
The labor supply consists of four types of workers: male, female, skilled and unskilled. They can work in the private sector as formal or informal workers, and in the government services, or be unemployed. The government sector hires only formal workers. Therefore, there are 12 ways to be hired. We assume short term scenarios, thus the level of skill is not mutable.
Any worker can either be part of the formal private sector, work informally, be on the government's payroll or be unemployed. The index set .-JJ is defined by:
.-JJ = :1, 51, :8, 58
:1 : skilled male; 51: unskilled male 
Formal-informal migration
The elasticity ! $PQQ represents the ease of movement between the formal and the informal sector for each idiosyncratic group of labor. For instance, the higher ! OI (the elasticity among unskilled female workers) then the bigger movement of labor from informality to formality (or vice versa) given a change in the relative wages of unskilled formal and unskilled informal women workers. When we talk about labor migration, we refer to a movement inside the 4 idiosyncratic labor categories because it is possible, for example, to have a formal unskilled male worker turn to the informal sector, but it is not possible for him to acquire a higher skill level, at least not in the short term.
We postulate that there is an order of values for the idiosyncratic groups. This ordering gives greater mobility to unskilled than to skilled workers, and also greater mobility to female than to male workers. Since ! $PQQ can be interpreted as summarizing the preferences for the formal or informal sector, we assume that female workers are more likely to join the informal ranks since the flexible schedule in an informal job makes it easier to balance work and family. We also presume that skilled workers have submitted themselves to years of schooling precisely because they know formal jobs usually require formal education and consequently they possess a higher preference for formality. However, the results of the model could change in function of the assumed values for ! $PQQ . We confront this issue by analysing the sensibility of the model to ! $PQQ .
Public services: labor demand and wages
Here we make three modelling decisions concerning the Public Services: labor demand is exogenous, wage is exogenous and real government consumption is constant.
These three statements imply that the government can increase employment without elevating the level of production. That means that in this case, labor productivity decreases.
The model has 16 labor factors, 8 of which relate to the public services activity. The introduction of an exogenous labor demand and real wages in the public services is straightforward:
.; $ is exogenous for . = :/:1, :/51, :/:8, :/58 #7 $ is exogenous for . = :/:1, :/51, :/:8, :/58
This mechanism allows us to easily fix the level of public labor and wages. For the base scenario, labor and wages in public services are equal to the registered levels in 2012.
Note that for informal workers, the value of .; and #7 are defined as zero exogenously.
Public services: production
Labor demand for each type of labor . and for all activities \, with the exception of labor employed in public services, follows the first order condition of a CES production function. For labor demand in public services, ] represents the endogenous efficiency of the public services CES production function. An increase of labor allocated to the public services production will reduce the labor supplied to the formal and informal markets and will impact the level of efficiency ] in the public services. Consequently the level of production in the public services activity remains unchanged. All 4 public sector labor categories are exogenous. The simulation allows for specific changes in any single one of them without considering substitution or complementarity, since ] L_ adjusts itself to keep constant the volume of production regardless of the composition of labor. However, in the section focused in the simulation, we assume an equal increase rate in the labor demand of all public services categories.
Unlike Gelb (1991), we prefer not to call a public services activity with demand derived from a CES production function neoclassical and a demand with a different derivation nonneoclassical. Suffice to bear in mind the different reasons behind hiring in the public services.
Labor market clearing: supply equals demand
Labor market clearing states that total labor supply of a type of labor .: $ (adjusted for the rate of unemployment) is equal to the sum of sectorial demands for each labor type .; $,' .
With the exception of labor allocated in public services, wages adjust to achieve equilibrium through movement between formality, informality and unemployment. Labor allocated to public services is exogenous and is satisfied first. Labor demand for any other labor type different from the public services categories is the result of cost minimization of a CES production function in each type of activity and depends on the wage #% $,' , the composite wage and the usual parameters.
.: $ 1 − 5 $ = .; $,' = ' .; $
Macroclosure
General equilibrium has an all-encompassing spirit but, like every economic model, needs to draw the line between what is inside and outside; that is, the endogenous and exogenous variables. Macroclosure rules state the exogenous variables and ensure that the model reaches the equilibrium. Also, a closure decision implies an assumption of causality.
To specify the model, it is usual to introduce three closure rules related to the government budget, savings-investment equilibrium and the external balance. The extended model is capable of handling all possible combinations of these balances and letting the capital move freely with the use of an excel spreadsheet. We assume that the government balances the budget via variation in savings. In this manner, we mirror the usual government strategy for dealing with a drop in fiscal income.
The model is savings-driven, which means investment follows the existing savings.
Historically, Bolivian savings have been low and external savings supplement them. The export price boom reversed this situation and allowed an increase in investment. Foreign savings are fixed. A glut in imports has to be counterbalanced with a boost in exports. This assumption is adequate for mirroring external financing restrictions.
In all instances we assume a short term movement. Therefore we fix the volume of capital used in each activity. In the short term the volume of unskilled labor is also fixed, without having the possibility of seeing the impact of schooling on the level of skilled labor.
Finally, this is a real model and there is homogeneity in prices, consequently the choice of the numeraire does not affect the results.
Simulations
The aim of this section is to analyze the impact of further pursuing the wage and labor policy inside a context of a decrease in the prices of exports. This exercise lights the path of policy making in times of dwindling external resources. We start with a 2012 dataset that already has labor and wage policies implemented in the past in place. Then, we simulate the impact of (a) further increasing unproductive public sector employment, (b) further increasing the real minimum wage, and c) dropping the prices of exports. Another two scenarios are the result of combining the above (see Table 7 ). In ldpub1-inc the 6% increase in public sector labor corresponds to the yearly average growth rate of public servants for the past five years. To capture the influence of the permanent increase of formal salaries in wmin-inc, we focus the attention on the compulsory growth rate of the formal private wage, on average equal to 3%. The comb-labpol scenario aggregates the last two scenarios and evaluates the labor policy.
There are two main characteristics of the external shock associated with the end of the commodity prices boom. Hid-dec relates to the first characteristic by reducing the oil price by 24%, which is the gap between the expected price in the government budget and the actual price for the first trimester in 2016. The natural gas price in Bolivia is calculated via a formula that takes as the international price of WTI oil the main input. The goal is to reduce gas price volatility and take advantage of the export market dependence (Brazil and Argentina) on Bolivian supply. The second characteristic is the drop in the international price of minerals. We mirror this movement with a 7% reduction in the export price of minerals equal to the decrease in the index price of exported minerals.
Finally, comb1 merges the labor and wage policy scenarios with the external shock. In this manner, we assess the impact of the labor and wage policy and also the influence of the external shock through the comparison of key macroeconomic variables (GDP growth, household consumption, investment, unemployment, etc.), wages and the rate of informality. 
V. Results
This section reports the interpretation of the results. The percentage change in macroeconomic variables from the different scenarios with respect to the base setup is in The external shock scenario assumes a 24% drop in the oil price (see Table 1 ). The natural gas price variation is slightly below 4%. This gap arises due to a downward slope demand curve for hydrocarbons. In this way, we portray the role of the formula used to calculate the price of oil; that is, the reduction of price volatility.
From an increase of public services demand of labor, we record a rise in household consumption due to higher wages. This provokes the reduction of the GDP. The construction sector accounts for 7% of the value added and suffers the biggest drop in this scenario, almost 4%. Household demand cannot be held responsible for this drop because households do not consume goods coming from this activity. Taking into account that the closure rule for the savings and investment equilibrium is savings driven, or in other words the level of investment follows the available savings, the drop comes from a lower investment due to lower government savings. Higher labor demand in public services means a lower level of government savings. Moreover, the drop in government savings -to balance the budget-has an adverse impact on investment that ultimately would drag down the GDP, were this a dynamic model 6 .
The interconnection between sectors of the labor market is evident in wage and 6 In the year 2012, 60% of the GDP came from final household demand and 19% from gross fixed capital.
unemployment rate changes (see Table 8 and Table 9 ). Public services provision is intensive in female skilled labor and this type of labor displays the highest increase in wages regarding the informal sector. A higher labor demand in public services reduces the pool of labor for the rest of the activities. Capital is fixed, thus the private sector has to settle with the amount of capital already allocated and cannot substitute capital for labor. A lower supply of labor combined with higher household demand reduces the rate of unemployment, most of all among skilled women which is also due to having a public services activity intensive in this type of labor. Nevertheless, unemployment in formal skilled and unskilled males increases due to the drop in the construction sector (highly intensive in male labor).
The 3% raise in formal wages ultimately has a negative influence on household consumption. Labor supply, faced with higher wages in the formal sector, chooses to migrate to formality. However, formal labor demand decreases because of higher costs. As a result, unemployment rises, counterbalancing the effect of higher wages on household consumption. We should expect a higher general level of wages in the informal sector: firms increase their informal payroll substituting formal for informal labor increasing pressure on informal wages. Ultimately, the economic contraction caused by a raise in formal wages diminishes the level of wages in the informal sector.
The Bolivian GDP is adversely influenced by the labor policy in its two components (real formal wage increase and public labor demand increase). When combined, the labor policy has an almost 1% negative impact on GDP (see Figure 6 ). Nevertheless, the combined labor policy has a mixed effect on informal wages: higher informal wages in the case of a surge in demand of labor in public services, and lower informal wages in the case of a mandatory increase in formal wages. At the end of the day, lower informal wages dominate the scenario, except for skilled females, who are the main beneficiaries of public sector openings.
Bolivia's dependency on natural resources and raw material exports is evident in the large negative effect of a drop in the price of natural gas on the economy. The biggest danger is the drop in investment: less government income translates into less investment.
The dynamic effects of a reduction of nearly a quarter of the investment is not captured by a static model. However, it should not be neglected. Also, the real exchange depreciation allows the economy to sustain the level of exports. The 3.2% reduction in household consumption, along with the drop in investment, are the source of a fall in imports.
Even though the total the rigidity in formal wages shields formal workers form a negative effect of a drop in export prices on their income, the jump in the unemployment rate is larger in the formal than in the informal sector (see Table 9 ). In this sense, the model displays the usual different behavior of informal versus formal workers, even in the case of a drop in wages, they tend to stay working in comparison to their formal pears.
In general, the drop in the export price of minerals has the same effects of the drop in natural gas price. Therefore, the combined effect of both negative external shocks is essentially a simple sum of them 7 .
Household consumption increases because of the labor policy, but at the expense of the primarization of the economy. Skilled labor is in short supply in Bolivia, an increase of formal wages and labor demand in public services puts pressure on the secondary sector.
Exports from the secondary sector of the economy fall and imports of services increase, generating an export substitution effect.
The primarization (see Table 10 ) of the economy originated in the labor policy is accompanied by an apparent formalization (see Table 11 ). In other words, there is an increase in the rate of formal employment. Nevertheless, once we consider the jump in the unemployment rate, the gains in formalization are to the detriment of labor demand.
VI. Sensitivity analysis
The results of the CGE model could change drastically upon the choice of parameter values. To ensure robustness, it is advisable to run the model with different parameter values. As stated above, part of the parameters in the model come from the usual criteria and part from econometric estimation. However, the elasticity of transformation ! for each aggregated labor category comes from the authors' assumptions and thus, its influence on GDP variation, household consumption and unemployment should be put to test. In Table   12 , we select 6 sets of values for !. The second set contains the values used to obtain the general results. We conclude that although the magnitude of change varies, the sign of the changes does not. Hence, the results are robust to changes in the values of ! (see Figure 7 to Figure 10 ).
VII. Conclusions and policy implications
The CGE methodology allows us to isolate the influence of the current labor policy: an adverse effect in aggregated production and a positive effect on household consumption, while pushing for the primarization and an apparent formalization of the economy. The negative effects are mimicked by the larger impact of surging export prices in natural gas and minerals while the positive effect on household consumption is at the cost of less investment. Therefore, the success of the last decade of economic policy does not arise from the expanding public sector or the swelling formal wages.
An adverse external shock deepens the undesirable effects of labor policy. Depending on the extent to which the current labor policy continues, the fiscal reserves and the possible sources of funding will be depleted. Therefore, a correction of course in labor and wage policy depending on the external market conditions is needed.
It is not advisable to have permanent increments above the rate of inflation in wages, without considering the external context. Also, informal workers should be part of the debate on salary increments because they are indirectly affected through changes in household consumption and unemployment. Total  Agricultural nonindustrial  12  1  8  1  14  0  53  10  0  100  Agricultural industrial  0  0  0  0  1  0  5  1  94  100  Coca  0  0  1  0  10  5  57  24  4  100  Livestock  5  2  2  0  17  2  51  17  4  100  Forestry, hunting and fishing  5  0  51  2  7  0  29  2  4  100  Crude Oil and Natural Gas  6  3  1  0  0  0  0  0  90  100  Non-and metallic minerals  9  3  12  1  3  0  9  1  63  100  Fresh and Processed Meat  9  5  5  2  6  0  7  3  63  100  Dairy products  13  6  7  4  2  1  2  2  63  100  Mill Products and Bakery  11  3  11  0  4  1  2 Source: Authors' elaboration based on HS and SUT Appendix B
Tables and Figures
Elasticities of household final demand
The household micro data used in for this estimation is provided by the Instituto The estimated elasticities and their associated p-values of the type household consumption can be seen in Table 13 . The parameter estimates are mostly statistically significant. Goods totalexpen*** totper*** constant*** totalexpen*** totper*** constant*** totalexpen*** totper*** constant*** totalexpen*** totper*** constant***
